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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the diﬀerential eﬀects of equally restrictive
access price regulations in an industry where a vertically integrated rm has a monopoly
on the supply of an essential network service and also operates in the competitive
product market. In public utility industries, such as telecommunications, electricity
generation, gas supply, and train services, no service can be supplied without access
to essential network facility, which is generally monopolized. The examples for this
are the networks for electricity and gas transmissions and railway tracks. Since the
recent wave of the liberalization of potentially competitive sectors promotes new entry
(for example, the liberalization of the retail electricity market in Japan), access price
regulation becomes one of important policy issues in public utilities. In addition, the
eﬃcient and stable operation of essential facility is an important problem because there
are concerns that the liberalization discourages investment for using the infrastructures
of public utilities more eﬃciently.
Main access price regulation was developed by cost-based approaches. The examples
for this are Eﬃcient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and Total Element Long Run
Increment Cost (TELRIC).1 Such cost-based regulation discourages a regulated rm
from reducing its cost because price is set such that the total revenue from each service
covers the total cost in its production. Access price-cap regulation was also adopted
in the interstate access charge in the U.S. telecommunication and non-competitive in-
terconnection service in the U.K. telecommunication. Price-cap regulation provides a
regulated rm with the incentive for cost reduction because the regulator sets a ceil-
ing of the price which is charged by the rm. Price-cap regulation was recommended
as an incentive regulatory method by Littlechild (1983) and subsequently has been
1For the ECPR, which got into the limelight as an access pricing rule, see Willing (1979), Baumol
(1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994a, 1994b), Kahn and Taylor (1994), Tye (1994), and Sidak and Spulber
(1997). For the TELRIC, which stole the limelight from the ECPR, see Economides and White (1994,
1995) and Hausman (1997).
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adopted for many public utilities and privatized monopoly rms instead of cost-based
regulations (e.g. British Telecom and AT&T). With such regulatory shift, the prob-
lems arising from price-cap regulation have been addressed by many economists.2 The
literature has only compared the eﬀects of cost-based and price-cap regulations in a
model of monopoly.3
We focus on access price regulation on a vertically integrated rm which monop-
olizes the supply of an essential network service and also operates in the competitive
product market.4 When the product market is imperfectly competitive, the vertically
integrated rm makes its infrastructure investment and output decisions strategically.
Investment level is chosen not only to reduce the cost of using the network, but also
to make a credible commitment to higher output level and discourage the production
of its rival rms. That is, the behavior of the vertically integrated rm is aﬀected by
not only the regulatory method of access price but also the strategic interaction among
rms in the product market. Therefore, in order to compare the relative performance
of the regulation on access price charged by the vertically integrated rm, the analysis
in consideration of the strategic interaction in the product market is also required.
We consider an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities
are vertically related. The incumbent has a monopoly on the supply of an essential
2Acton and Vogelsang (1989) provided the survey on the main issues and pioneering studies of
price-cap regulation. For theoretical comparison of cost reduction under cost-based and price-cap reg-
ulations, see Cabral and Riordan (1989), Schmalensee (1989), Clemenz (1991), and Kidokoro (2002).
For the price-caps which are converged on eﬃcient price structures, see Bradley and Price (1988), Vo-
gelsang (1989), and Brennan (1989). The deterioration of service quality under price-cap regulation
was pointed out by Spence (1975), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Noam (1991), Rovizzi and Thompson
(1992), Kidokoro (2002), Sappington (2005), and Weisman (2005). For the problem of how price-cap
should be revised when there exists asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated
rm, see Sibley (1989), Lewis and Sappington (1989), Earle et al. (2007). For the problem of regulat-
ing a rm serving both monopoly and competitive markets, see Bös (1978), Vogelsang and Finsinger
(1979), Braeutigam and Panzar (1989), and De Fraja and Price (1999). For intertemporal price-cap
regulation, see Hagerman (1990), Sappington and Sibley (1992), and Dobbs (2004). For the relation-
ship between price-cap regulation on an essential network division and product market competition,
see Reitzes (2008).
3See, for instance, Schmalensee (1989), Clemenz (1991), and Kidokoro (2002).
4For the recent survey on access price regulation, see Vogelsang (2003).
3
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network service and also competes with entrants in a homogeneous product market.
Entrants can access the network if they pay an access price charged by the incumbent.
The regulator imposes a regulatory constraint on access price, while it does not reg-
ulate the product market price, which is determined in the market. Three types of
the regulatory methods is analyzed in the model: cost-of-service regulation, price-cap
regulation, and a hybrid form of cost-of-service and price-cap regulations. Under cost-
of-service regulation, access price is set such that the total revenue from the network
service covers the total cost of operating the network. Under price-cap regulation, only
a ceiling for access price is set. Under a hybrid form of cost-of-service and price-cap
regulations, on the other hand, access price partially depends on the actual cost of
network operation. The incumbent invests to reduce the cost of using the network.
The regulator and the rms behave in three stages. In the rst stage, the regulator
chooses a regulatory method of access price. In the second, the incumbent strategically
precommits itself to cost-reducing investment level and chooses an access price of the
network. In the third, the incumbent and entrants choose their output levels in the
Cournot fashion.
In order to compare diﬀerent kind of regulatory methods, it is analyzed under
equally restrictive regulations, in which access price is regulated such that the vertically
integrated incumbent earns zero prot at most from the network division. The main
results are as follows. When the vertically related incumbent produces a larger output
than its rival entrants, social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form of price-cap
and cost-of-service regulations which induces a larger cost reduction than price-cap
regulation. When the vertically related incumbent produces a smaller output than its
rival entrants, on the other hand, social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form
of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations which leads a smaller cost reduction than
price-cap regulation.
Schmalensee (1989), Cremenz (1991), and Kidokoro (2002) compared the relative
4
関西大学『経済論集』第64巻第3, 4号（2015年3月）
60
276
welfare eﬀect of price-cap regulation with the equally restrictive cost-based regulation
and a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-based regulations in a model of monopoly.
They showed that price-cap regulation has a relative welfare advantage over equally
restrictive cost-based regulation and a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-based regula-
tions when cost-reducing investment is carried out and no cost uncertainty exists. Our
results demonstrate that their analysis has a limitation in that the results do not survive
in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically
related. Schmalensee (1989) also compared the eﬀects of price-cap and cost-based reg-
ulations with cost uncertainty, using a numerical simulation method. Kidokoro (2002)
also compared them in the case of quality-improving investment. In such cases, they
showed that social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-
based regulations. Our result is diﬀerent from theirs in the following two points. First,
our result is derived from diﬀerent factors from theirs. The main factor of our result is
the distortion of investment behavior from cost minimization caused by the strategic
interaction in the product market. Second, we show that there exists the case where
social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form of cost-of-service and price-cap regula-
tions which induces a larger cost reduction than price-cap regulation. In the previous
studies, only a hybrid form of cost-of-service and price-cap regulations which leads a
smaller cost reduction than price-cap regulation is analyzed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in
Section 2 and characterize the equilibrium in Section 3. The diﬀerential eﬀects of
equally restrictive access price regulations on investment, access price, market price,
prot, and welfare are compared in Section 4. Concluding remarks are given in Section
5. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
5
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2 The model
Let us suppose that there exists an industry in which an incumbent competes with n
identical entrants. The incumbent and entrants produce a homogeneous product. In
order to supply one unit of the product, one unit of access to an essential network
facility is required. We assume that the incumbent has a monopoly on the network
operation and allows entrants to access the network at the price of a per unit of access.
The access price that the incumbent charges entrants is regulated.
The incumbent incurs the production cost, cIx, when it produces x units of the
product, while entrant i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) bears the production cost, cEyi, when it
produces yi units. The market demand is represented by an inverse demand function,
P = A − Q, in which A > 0 and Q = x +Pni=1 yi. The total output level, Q, is
assumed to be veriable.5 The incumbent invests in order to reduce the marginal cost
of using the network. Let θ(k) be the marginal cost of using the network when the
incumbent carries out k units of cost-reducing investment. We assume that the value
of θ(k) is observable for the regulator but, as Shleifer (1985) assumed, its functional
form is unobservable.
Assumption 1 The cost function, θ (k), has the following properties: (i) θ0 (k) < 0,
limk→0 θ0 (k) = −∞, and limk→+∞ θ0 (k) = 0; and (ii) θ00 (k) > 0.
The incumbent bears the total cost of the network service, C = θ (k)Q+F , where
F is the xed cost, when it makes k units of cost-reducing investment and the total
output level is Q. We assume that the regulator can observe the levels of the total
and xed costs of the network operation, C and F . This assumption implies that the
regulator can calculate the marginal cost level of using the network, θ (k), from the
values of C, F , and Q.
5This assumption is not unrealistic. For example, Japanese electric power companies must notify
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of their electric supply plans over the next decade.
6
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For access price regulation, the regulator employs three regulatory methods: price-
cap regulation, cost-of-service regulation, and a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-
of-service regulations. In the model, for analytical simplicity, price-cap regulation is
expressed as
aB ≥ a, (1)
where aB is a constant base price per unit of access, which is determined by the
regulator.6 Under cost-of-service regulation, on the other hand, the regulator adjusts
access price to be equal to the cost of providing the network service. We assume
that the regulator can give the incumbent a lump-sum subsidy equal to the xed cost
of using the network, F .7 Under this assumption, cost-of-service regulation can be
expressed as
θ (k)
nX
i=1
yi ≥ a
nX
i=1
yi. (2)
Dividing both sides of (2) byPni=1 yi, cost-of-service regulation can be rewritten as
θ (k) ≥ a (3)
Combining (1) with (3), we obtain the following regulatory constraint that includes
price-cap and cost-of-service regulations:
θ (k) + μ {aB − θ (k)} ≥ a, (4)
where μ ≥ 0. (4) reduces to cost-of-service regulation when μ = 0, to price-cap
regulation when μ = 1, and to a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations
6Littlechild (1983) recommended price-cap regulation in a dynamic framework: the ceiling price
should change according to the RPI − X rule, where RPI is the rate of change in the retail price
index and X is the expected gain in the utility rm’s eﬃciency.
7Who bears the xed cost of essential facility is an important matter for the regulator. An increase
in the incumbent’s share of the xed cost would reduce its investment. This paper does not consider
the eﬀect of the allocation rule of the xed cost on investment.
7
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otherwise. When μ > 0, the regulator allows the incumbent to reserve the return on
cost-reducing eﬀort, which is expressed by the product of the rate of return, μ, and the
diﬀerence between the base price and the marginal cost of using the network realized
after the incumbent’s cost-reducing investment, aB − θ (k). The regulator imposes the
regulatory constraint like (4). The regulatory constraint is assumed to bind access
price in the equilibrium, though it does not have to be that way in the case where the
base price is suﬃciently high.8
It is necessary to analyze under equally restrictive regulations on access price in
order to compare diﬀerent kind of regulatory methods. For this reason, the regulator
is assumed to determine the rate of return, μ, and then always set the base price, aB,
such that the incumbent’s prot obtained from the network division is zero at most.
That is, under any μ, aB is set to the same level as the actual marginal cost of using
the network, θ (k).9 Therefore, under our assumptions, access price regulation imposes
zero-prot constraint on the network division, so that the incumbent can only earn
zero prot at most from the network division irrespective of the regulatory constraint.
The prot functions of the incumbent and entrant i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) are written as
respectively
Π = {P (Q)− cI − a}x+ {a− θ (k)}Q− k (5)
and
Ei = {P (Q)− cE − a} yi. (6)
Social welfare is dened as the sum of economic surplus obtained by all participants:
that is,
W ≡ CS +Π+ nP
i=1
Ei − F , (7)
8If the regulatory constraint is not binding , then the equilibrium must coincide with that under
free access pricing by the incumbent.
9This presupposes that the regulator can predict the gains in the productivity of the network
division from the historical data on the incumbent’s cost and the information on its current technology
and R&D plan, even if the cost for a cost reduction of the network operation is unobservable.
8
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where CS denotes consumers’ surplus, which is dened as
CS ≡
Z Q
0
P (v) dv − P (Q)Q. (8)
We analyze a three-stage game. In the rst stage, the regulator chooses a rate of
return on cost-reducing eﬀort, μ, so as to maximize social welfare on the assumption
that under any μ, the base price, aB, is set to the same level as the expected marginal
cost of using the network, θ (k), in full anticipation of the equilibria of the second and
third stages. In the second, the incumbent chooses its investment level, k, and the
price per unit of access to the network, a, so as to maximize its prot, taking as given
the values of μ and aB. In the third, the incumbent and n entrants choose their output
levels in the Cournot fashion. Note that throughout the analysis, the policy variables
do not change during the competition among rms in the second and third stages. We
use subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept and solve this game by backward
induction.
3 Equilibrium
Before comparing the eﬀects of equally restrictive regulations on access price, we ex-
amine the characteristics of the equilibrium in the model.
3.1 Equilibrium output
In the third stage, the incumbent chooses its output level, x, so as to maximize its
prot, taking as given the values of its investment level, k, and access price, a, chosen
in the second stage and the output levels of entrant i (i = 1, · · · , n), yi. Entrant i
(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) also chooses its output level, yi, so as to maximize its prot, taking
as given the value of a in the second stage and the output levels of the incumbent and
9
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entrant j (j 6= i), x and yj. Making use of (5) and (6), the rst-order conditions for
the prot maximization of the incumbent and entrant i are respectively
P (Q)− cI − a+ P 0 (Q)x+ {a− θ (k)} ∂Q∂x = 0 (9)
and
P (Q)− cE − a+ P 0 (Q) yi = 0. (10)
The equilibrium output levels of the incumbent and entrant i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) for
any relevant k, a, and n are respectively
x∗ (k, a, n) = 1n+ 2 {A− (n+ 1) cI + ncE + na− (n+ 1) θ (k)} (11)
and
y∗i (k, a, n) = 1n+ 2 {A+ cI − 2cE − 2a+ θ (k)} . (12)
In what follows, since entrants are identical, let y∗ (k, a, n) denote the symmetric
equilibrium output level of each entrant for any k, a, and n. We will assume that
x∗ (k, a, n) > 0 and y∗ (k, a, n) > 0, which hold if A is suﬃciently large relative to cI ,
cE, and θ (0). Making use of (11) and (12), the prot functions of the incumbent and
entrant i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) are rewritten respectively as
Π∗ (k, a, n) = x∗ (k, a, n)2 + {a− θ (k)}ny∗ (k, a, n)− k (13)
and
E∗i (k, a, n) = y∗ (k, a, n)2 . (14)
10
関西大学『経済論集』第64巻第3, 4号（2015年3月）
66
282
3.2 Equilibrium access price and investment
In the second stage, given the values of μ and aB set in the rst stage, the incumbent
solves the following constrained prot maximization problem:
maxk,a Π
∗ (k, a, n)
subject to θ (k) + μ {aB − θ (k)} ≥ a.
In order to state the rst-order and second-order conditions for the maximization prob-
lem, we make the Lagrangian:
Λ (k, a,λ) = Π∗ (k, a, n) + λ {μaB + (1− μ) θ (k)− a} , (15)
where λ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Let k∗, a∗, and λ∗ be the solutions to the max-
imization problem. That is, k∗ and a∗ denote respectively the investment level and
access price in the second-stage equilibrium.
Since we consider the case where the constraint is biding, that is, λ > 0, the rst-
order conditions are
Λk = − θ
0 (k)
n+ 2 [2 (n+ 1)x
∗ + n (n+ 2) y∗ − n {a− θ (k)}] + λ (1− μ) θ0 (k)− 1 = 0,
(16)
Λa = 2nn+ 2x
∗ + ny∗ − 2nn+ 2 {a− θ (k)}− λ = 0, (17)
and
Λλ = μaB + (1− μ) θ (k)− a = 0, (18)
where Λi (i = k, a,λ) denotes ∂Λ (k, a,λ) /∂i. From (18), the equilibrium access price
11
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is a∗ (μ, aB, k∗) = θ (k∗) + μ {aB − θ (k∗)}. Substituting (17) and (18) into (16) yields
−
∙½
1 + (2μ− 1)nn+ 2
¾
x∗ + μny∗ − μ (2μ− 1)nn+ 2 {aB − θ (k
∗)}
¸
θ0 (k∗) = 1. (19)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (19) represents the marginal revenue from a marginal
increase in investment at k = k∗, while the right-hand side (RHS) is equal to the
marginal cost. It is demonstrated in (19) that the strategic interaction in the output
stage distorts the incumbent’s investment behavior from cost minimization. When
the regulator sets aB to the level of θ (k∗) in advance, the production cost is min-
imized when the investment level satises − (x∗ + μny∗) θ0 (k∗) = 1. Owing to the
presence of the strategic interaction in the output stage, (19) validates that with
aB = θ (k∗), − (x∗ + μny∗) θ0 (k∗) > (resp. =, <) 1 if and only if μ < (resp. =, >)
1/2. − (x∗ + μny∗) θ0 (k∗) > (resp. <) 1 implies that the ineﬃciency is caused by un-
derinvestment (resp. overinvestment) from the viewpoint of the incumbent’s prot. If
we let Φ (μ, aB, k, n) be the formula in the LHS of (19), then the equilibrium investment
level must satisfy
Φ (μ, aB, k, n) = 1. (20)
That is, in the second-stage equilibrium,
θ0 (k∗) = − n+ 22 (μn+ 1)x∗ + μn (n+ 2) y∗ + μ (1− 2μ)n {aB − θ (k∗)} (21)
holds. With the assumption of x∗ > 0 and y∗ > 0, the condition of θ0 (k∗) satised at
the limits is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of the second-stage equilibrium. In
addition, to guarantee its uniqueness, the following assumption is made (see appendix
C for the details of the uniqueness).
Assumption 2 θ (k) is suﬃciently convex such that θ00 (k) > −θ0 (k)3 /2 holds for any
k ≥ 0.
12
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3.3 Equilibrium regulatory constraint
Substituting k = k∗ (μ, aB, n) into (7) and (8) gives social welfare when the incumbent
carries out k∗ units of investment for any μ , aB, and n:
W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) =
Z Q∗
0
P (Q) dQ− cIx∗ − cEny∗ − θ (k∗)Q∗ − k∗ − F , (22)
where x∗ = x∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n), y∗ = y∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n), and Q∗ = Q∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n).
In the rst stage, the regulator chooses a rate of return, μ, so as to maximize
social welfare within the limit of μ ≥ 0 subject to zero-prot constraint on network
division. To solve this social welfare maximization problem, we consider the following
maximization problem:
maxμ W
∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
subject to μ ≥ 0.
In order to state the rst-order and second-order conditions for the maximization prob-
lem, we make the Lagrangian:
Ψ (μ,ψ) =W ∗ (μ, k∗ (μ, aB, n) , n) + ψμ, (23)
where ψ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Let μ∗ and ψ∗ be the solutions to the maximization
problem. That is, μ∗ denote the rate of return in the rst-stage equilibrium. The rst-
order conditions are
Ψμ =W ∗μ +W ∗k ∂k
∗ (μ, aB, n)
∂μ + ψ = 0, (24)
Ψψ = μ ≥ 0, ψΨψ = 0, and ψ ≥ 0, (25)
13
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where Ψi (i = μ,ψ) denotes ∂Ψ (μ,ψ) /∂i and W ∗i (i = k,μ) ∂W (μ, aB, k∗, n) /∂i.
Diﬀerentiating (22) and making use of (19), we obtain that
W ∗μ = n {aB − θ (k
∗)}
n+ 2 [x
∗ − 2y∗ − 2μ {aB − θ (k∗)}] (26)
and
W ∗k = −θ
0 (k∗)
n+ 2 [(n+ 1)x
∗ + n (n+ 3) y∗ − μn {x∗ + (n+ 4) y∗}] . (27)
From (26), under aB = θ (k∗), W ∗μ = 0 is obtained. ∂k∗ (μ, aB, n) /∂μ > 0 holds for any
μ and n, which will be proved in the proof of proposition 1 below (see appendix A). From
(27), it can be easily conrmed that W ∗k (μ, aB, k∗, n) > 0 holds for μ = 0. Thus, the
rate of return in the rst-stage equilibrium is μ∗ > 0 such that W ∗k (μ∗, aB, k∗, n) = 0
holds. The fact that W ∗k (μ, aB, k∗, n) > 0 for μ = 0 assures the existence of the
equilibrium rate of return. In addition to assumptions 1 and 2, we assume the following
condition in order to guarantee its uniqueness (see appendix C for the details).
Assumption 3 θ (k) is suﬃciently convex such that subject to zero-prot constraint
on the network division, d2W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) /dμ2 < 0 holds for any μ and n.
4 Non-equivalence under constrained entry
4.1 Investment, price, and prot
Let us begin our analysis by examining the eﬀects of equally restrictive regulations on
investment, access price, market price, and prot in the case of constrained entry into
the product market. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 1 When the number of rms in the product market is xed, the invest-
ment increases, the access price rises (resp. falls) for μ > (resp. <) 1, the market
price rises (resp. falls) for μ > (resp. <) 1+1/n, the incumbent’s prot decreases, and
14
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each entrant’s prot decreases (resp. increases) for μ > (resp. <) 1/2 as the value of
μ increases.
Proof. See appendix A.
Under cost-of-service regulation, an investment for reducing the cost of the network
operation leads directly to a reduction in access price. Under price-cap regulation and
a hybrid form of cost-of-service and price-cap regulations, on the other hand, the access
price is higher than θ(k) by the return on cost-reducing eﬀort. Thus, under the zero-
prot constraint on the network division, as the value of μ increases, the incumbent
has a stronger incentive to cost-reducing investment, which encourages its production.
An increase in μ produces the eﬀect of decreasing access price by inducing a larger
cost-reducing investment, while it has the eﬀect of increasing access price by oﬀering
a higher return on cost reduction. From (4), access price is higher than θ(k) by a part
of cost reduction if μ < 1. Thus, an increase in μ under μ > (resp. <) 1 produces a
smaller (resp. larger) former eﬀect than the latter, so that the access price rises (resp.
falls).
Investment has two diﬀerent eﬀects on the outputs and prots of entrants. One is a
negative business-stealing eﬀect: the incumbent can make a credible commitment to a
higher output level when increasing its investment, which discourages the production
of entrants and leads to their lower prots. The other is a positive free-riding eﬀect:
an increase in investment encourages the production of entrants and increases their
prots through a reduction in access price. When the incumbent marginally increases
its investment under a regulation with μ ∈ (1/2, 1) (resp. μ < 1/2), the business-
stealing (resp. free-riding) eﬀect dominates the other. Accordingly, because a marginal
increase in μ encourages the incumbent’s investment, such change in regulation under
μ ∈ (1/2, 1) (resp. μ < 1/2) decreases (resp. increases) each entrant’s output and
prot levels.
15
71
Access Price Regulation and Strategic Infrastructure Investment in Vertically Related Markets（Ishii） 287
Recall that under a regulation with μ > (resp. <) 1, investment increases (resp.
decreases) access price. A higher access price leads a smaller total output of n en-
trants. In addition, this output reduction of n entrants becomes larger as the num-
ber of entrants increases. Hence, an increase in investment under a regulation with
μ ∈ (1/2, 1 + 1/n) produces a larger expansion in the output of the incumbent than
the reduction in that of n entrants, which leads a lower market price.
Under a regulation with μ < 1/2, an increase in investment reduces the prot of
the incumbent because it promotes not only the production of the incumbent but also
that of each entrant, which makes the product market more competitive. Under the
regulation with μ > 1/2, on the other hand, it aggravates the ineﬃciency caused by
overinvestment from the viewpoint of the incumbent’s cost minimization, which yields
a lower prot of the incumbent. Consequently, the regulation with a higher μ decreases
the incumbent’s prot, because it promotes investment.
4.2 Social welfare
The next analysis deals with the eﬀects of equally restrictive regulations on social wel-
fare. Recall that the equilibrium rate of return is μ∗ > 0 such thatW ∗k (μ∗, aB, k∗, n) = 0
holds. Examining the sign of W ∗k (μ, aB, k∗, n), the following result is obtained.
Lemma 1 Given any number of entrants, n, (i) there exists μ ∈ [1, 2) such that
W ∗k (μ, aB, k∗, n) = 0 if x∗ ≥ ny∗and (ii) there exists μ ∈ (4/5, 1) such that W ∗k (μ∗, aB,
k∗, n) = 0 holds otherwise.
Proof. See appendix B.
In addition, comparing x∗ with ny∗ gives the following lemma.
Lemma 2 x∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) ≥ (resp. <) ny∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) if and only if cE ≥ (resp. <)
cI + ∆ (k∗, n), where ∆ (k∗, n) ≡ (n− 1) {A− cI − θ (k∗)} /3n and ∆ (k∗, n) has the
16
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following properties: (i) ∆ (k∗, n) ≥ 0; and (ii) for μ > 1/2, ∂∆ (k∗, n) /∂n > 0 and
∆ (k∗, n) converges to a positive nite value as n increases.
Proof. See appendix B.
Summarizing proposition 1 and lemmata 1 and 2, we obtain the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2 When the number of rms in the product market is xed, social welfare
is maximized under a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations with μ ∈
(1, 1 + 1/n) if cE > cI +∆ (k∗, n), under price-cap if cE = cI +∆ (k∗, n), and under a
hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations with μ ∈ (4/5, 1) otherwise.
An increase in the value of μ aﬀects consumers’ surplus and the joint prot of
the incumbent and n entrants through the expansion of the incumbent’s investment.
Under imperfect competition, the market price is higher than the marginal costs of
rms. Since an increase in investment under a regulation with μ > (resp. <) 1 + 1/n
subject to zero-prot constraint on the network division decreases (resp. increases) the
total output of the incumbent and n entrants (see the proof of proposition 1 in appendix
A), it aggravates (resp. alleviates) the ineﬃciency caused by underproduction, which
leads a smaller (resp. larger) consumers’ surplus. From the viewpoint of social welfare,
the regulator never imposes a regulation with μ > 1+1/n, which yields a smaller social
welfare.
When the regulator marginally increases the value of μ subject to zero-prot con-
straint on the network division, the eﬀect of this change in regulatory method on the
joint prot of the incumbent and n entrants is expressed as
dΠ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ + n
dE∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ =
µ∂Π∗
∂k + n
∂E∗
∂k
¶ dk∗
dμ
=
½2 (2μ− 1) θ0 (k∗) y∗
n+ 2
¾ dk∗
dμ . (28)
17
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From the brace in the RHS of (28), a marginal increase in investment at the second-
stage equilibrium under a regulation with μ < 1/2 alleviates the ineﬃciency caused by
underinvestment from the viewpoint of the joint prot, which leads a larger joint prot.
Similarly, a marginal increase in investment at the second-stage equilibrium under
μ = 1/2 neither increases nor decreases the joint prot. Thus, a marginal increase in μ
from a regulation with μ ≤ 1/2 improves social welfare because it increases investment
and the consumers’ surplus.
Under a regulation with μ > 1/2, on the other hand, a marginal increase in invest-
ment at the second-stage equilibrium aggravates the unprotability caused by overin-
vestment from the viewpoint of the joint prot. Whether the eﬀect of alleviating the
ineﬃciency from underproduction dominates that of aggravating unprotability from
overinvestment or not depends on the number of entrants and the diﬀerence in the
production costs the incumbent and each entrant.
First, suppose that cE ≥ cI+∆ (k∗, n). Investment expands the incumbent’s produc-
tion in a way that steals business from entrants. This production substitution between
the incumbent and entrants improves the production eﬃciency, because the incum-
bent’s marginal cost of production is lower than that of each entrant. For the reason,
when cE > cI +∆ (k∗, n), there exists a regulatory method with μ ∈ (1, 1 + 1/n) such
that a marginal increase in investment at the second-stage equilibrium produces the
aggravation eﬀect of overinvestment equal to the alleviation eﬀect of underproduction.
When cE = cI +∆ (k∗, n), on the other hand, the aggravation eﬀect of overinvestment
just oﬀsets the alleviation eﬀect of underproduction at the second-stage equilibrium
under price-cap regulation. Therefore, from assumption 3, this implies that social
welfare is maximized under a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations
with μ ∈ (1, 1 + 1/n) if cE > cI + ∆ (k∗, n) and under price-cap regulation if cE =
cI +∆ (k∗, n).
18
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Next, suppose that cE < cI+∆ (k∗, n). Since the production of the incumbent is less
eﬃcient than that of entrants, the incumbent has a higher incentive to investment in
order to obtain a larger market share by stealing business from entrants. This produc-
tion substitution between the incumbent and entrants makes the production eﬃciency
worse. Thus, the aggravation eﬀect of overinvestment dominates the alleviation eﬀect
of underproduction at the second-stage equilibrium under price-cap regulation, while
both eﬀects are just oﬀset at the second-stage equilibrium under a hybrid form of price-
cap and cost-of-service regulations with μ ∈ (4/5, 1). From assumption 3, this implies
social welfare is maximized under this hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service
regulations.
The previous studies showed that social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form
of price-cap and cost-based regulations when cost uncertainty exists. However, our
result is derived from diﬀerent factors from the previous studies. The main factor of
our result is the distortion of investment behavior from cost minimization caused by
the strategic interaction in the product market. In addition, we show that there exists
the case where social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form of cost-of-service and
price-cap regulations which leads a larger cost reduction than price-cap regulation. In
the previous studies, only a hybrid form of cost-of-service and price-cap regulations
which gives a lower incentive for cost reduction than price-cap regulation is analyzed.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed the eﬀects of access price regulation in an industry where a ver-
tically integrated rm has a monopoly on the supply of an essential network service
and also operates in the competitive product market. The vertically integrated rm
invests to reduce the cost of using the network. When access price is regulated such
that the vertically integrated rm earns zero prot at most from the supply of the net-
19
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work service, the following two main ndings are obtained. First, when the vertically
integrated rm produces a larger output than its rival rms, social welfare is maxi-
mized under a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations which induces
a larger cost reduction than price-cap regulation. When it produces a smaller output
than its rival rms, on the other hand, social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form
of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations which leads a smaller cost reduction than
price-cap regulation.
Although we have analyzed a very simplied situation where many features of public
utilities and regulatory methods are abstracted, the results give the following policy
implication. When deciding the regulatory method of access price in an industry where
a vertically integrated rm has a monopoly on the supply of an essential network service
and also operates in the competitive product market, the diﬀerence in production scale
between the vertically integrated rm and its rival rms in the product market should
be also taken into consideration.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
As a start, it is proved that k∗ (μ, aB, n) is increasing in μ and a∗ (μ, aB, k∗) is increasing
(resp. decreasing) in μ for μ > (resp. <) 1. Totally diﬀerentiating (16)-(18), we obtain
that
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
Λkk Λka Λkλ
Λak Λaa Λaλ
Λλk Λλa Λλλ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
dk∗
da∗
dλ∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
λ∗θ0 (k∗)
0
−aB + θ (k∗)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ dμ+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
−μ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ daB. (A.1)
Let H (μ, aB, k∗, n) be the prot from the network division when the incumbent makes
k∗ units of investment and sets access price to a∗ = μaB+(1− μ) θ (k∗). H (μ, aB, k∗, n)
20
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is dened by
H (μ, aB, k∗, n) ≡ μ {aB − θ (k∗)}ny∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) , (A.2)
where
y∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) = 1n+ 2 {A+ cI − 2cE − 2μaB + (2μ− 1) θ (k
∗)} . (A.3)
Since the regulator regulates access price such that the incumbent can only make zero
prot at most from the network division, H (μ, aB, k∗, n) = 0 holds. Thus, we obtain
the following identity:
∙
μny∗ + μ {aB − θ (k∗)}n∂y
∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂aB
¸
daB
+
∙
{aB − θ (k∗)}ny∗ + μ {aB − θ (k∗)}n∂y
∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂μ
¸
dμ = 0. (A.4)
Diﬀerentiating (A.3) and substituting it into (A.4), the following relationship between
aB and μ is derived:
daB = −aB − θ (k
∗)
μ dμ. (A.5)
Substituting (A.5) into (A.1) and arranging the terms, we nally obtain that
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
Λkk Λka Λkλ
Λak Λaa Λaλ
Λλk Λλa Λλλ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
dk∗
da∗
dλ∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
λ∗θ0 (k∗)
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ dμ. (A.6)
Making use of Cramer’s rule, from (A.6), we obtain that
dk∗
dμ =
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
λ∗θ0 (k∗) Λka Λkλ
0 Λaa Λaλ
0 Λλa Λλλ
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
D = −
λ∗θ0 (k∗)
D > 0 (A.7)
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and
da∗
dμ =
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
Λkk λ∗θ0 (k∗) Λkλ
Λak 0 Λaλ
Λλk 0 Λλλ
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
D = −
λ∗ (1− μ) θ0 (k∗)2
D > (resp. =, <) 0
if and only if μ > (resp. =, <) 1, where
D ≡
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
Λkk Λka Λkλ
Λak Λaa Λaλ
Λλk Λλa Λλλ
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
> 0,
which holds under assumption 2.
The proof that P (Q∗) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in μ for μ > (resp. <) 1+1/n
is straightforward. Making use of (11) and (12) gives
Q∗ (k, a, n) = 1n+ 2 {(n+ 1)A− cI − ncE − na− θ (k)} . (A.8)
Diﬀerentiating (A.8) and evaluating at the second-stage equilibrium under constrained
entry, k = k∗ (μ, aB, n) and a = a∗ (μ, aB, k∗), yields
dQ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ = −
n {aB − θ (k∗)}
n+ 2 −
(n− μn+ 1) θ0 (k∗)
n+ 2
dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ .
With aB = θ (k∗), because dk∗/dμ > 0, dQ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) /dμ > (resp. <) 0 for μ <
(resp. >) 1 + 1/n, which leads that dP (Q∗) /dμ > (resp. <) 0 with aB = θ (k∗) if
μ > (resp. <) 1 + 1/n.
Next, let us prove that the incumbent’s prot is decreasing in μ. Substituting
k = k∗ (μ, aB, n) and a = a∗ (μ, aB, k∗) = θ (k∗) + μ {aB − θ (k∗)} into (13) and diﬀer-
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entiating it leads to
dΠ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ =
∂Π∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂μ +
∂Π∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂k
dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ ,
where
∂Π∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂μ =
n {aB − θ (k∗)}
n+ 2 [2x
∗ + (n+ 2) y∗ − 2μ {aB − θ (k∗)}] .
With aB = θ (k∗), ∂Π∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) /∂μ = 0 holds. It follows from assumption 2
that with aB = θ (k∗), ∂Π∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) /∂k = Φ (μ, k, n) − 1 < 0 is valid for k >
k∗ (μ, aB, n). Hence, because dk∗ (μ, aB, n) /dμ > 0 from (A.7), dΠ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n) /dμ <
0 under aB = θ (k∗). As to the equilibrium prot of each entrant, diﬀerentiating (14)
and evaluating at k = k∗ (μ, aB, n) and a = a∗ (μ, aB, k∗) gives
dE∗i (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ =
∂E∗i (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂μ +
∂E∗i (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂k
dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ
= −4 {aB − θ (k
∗)} y∗
n+ 2 +
2 (2μ− 1) θ0 (k∗) y∗
n+ 2
dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ ,
which, because dk∗ (μ, aB, n) /dμ > 0, leads to dE∗i /dμ > (resp. =, <) 0 under aB =
θ (k∗) if μ < (resp. =, >) 1/2.¤
B. Proof of Lemmata 1 and 2
(27) is rewritten as
W ∗k = n {x
∗ + (n+ 4) y∗} θ0 (k∗)
n+ 2
∙
μ−
½
1 + x
∗ − ny∗
nx∗ + n (n+ 4) y∗
¾¸
,
where
4
5 < 1 +
x∗ − ny∗
nx∗ + n (n+ 4) y∗ < 2.
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Hence, there exists μ ∈ (1, 2) such that W ∗k (μ∗, aB, k∗, n) = 0 holds when x∗ > ny∗,
W ∗k = 0 holds under μ = 1 when x∗ = ny∗, and there exists μ ∈ (4/5, 1) such that
W ∗k (μ∗, aB, k∗, n) = 0 holds when x∗ < ny∗.
Subtracting ny∗ from x∗ yields
x∗ − ny∗ = 3nn+ 2 {cE − cI −∆ (k
∗, n)} ,
where
∆ (k∗, n) ≡ n− 13n {A− cI − θ (k
∗)} . (A.9)
It follows from x∗ > 0 that A− cI − θ (k∗) > 0, which implies ∆ (k∗, n) ≥ 0. Diﬀeren-
tiating (A.9) gives
d∆ (k∗, n)
dn =
A− cI − θ (k∗)
3n2 −
(n− 1) θ0 (k∗)
3n
dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dn .
Diﬀerentiating (20) gives
dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dn = −
Φn (μ, aB, k∗, n)
Φk (μ, aB, k∗, n) ,
where
Φn = ∂Φ∂n = −
2 (2μ− 1) θ0 (k∗)
(n+ 2)2 [x
∗ + y∗ − μ {aB − θ (k∗)}]
and
Φk = ∂Φ∂k =
θ00 (k∗)
θ0 (k∗) +
2θ0 (k∗)2
(n+ 2)2 {μ (1− μ)n (n+ 4) + 1} .
With aB = θ (k∗), Φn > 0 holds if μ > 1/2. Under assumption 2,
Φk < −θ
0 (k∗)2
2 +
2θ0 (k∗)2
(n+ 2)2 {μ (1− μ)n (n+ 4) + 1} = −
(2μ− 1)2 n (n+ 4) θ0 (k∗)2
2 (n+ 2)2 < 0.
Hence, we obtain that with aB = θ (k∗), dk∗/dn > 0 if μ > 1/2, which implies that
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∆ (k∗, n) is increasing in n for μ > 1/2. In addition, it follows from x∗ > 0 and dk∗/dn >
0 if μ > 1/2 that limn→+∞∆ (k∗, n) = ∆ (k∗, n) = {A− cI − limn→+∞ θ (k∗)} /3 > 0
for aB = θ (k∗) and μ > 1/2.¤
C. Uniqueness of the equilibrium
(i) Uniqueness of the second-stage equilibrium
The uniqueness of the second-stage equilibrium under constrained entry is guar-
anteed by the second-order condition for the incumbent’s prot maximization. The
second-order condition requires that the bordered Hessian matrix of the Lagrangian is
negative denite. The bordered Hessian matrix is
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
Λkk Λka Λkλ
Λak Λaa Λaλ
Λλk Λλa Λλλ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
θ00(k)
θ0(k) + 2θ
0(k)2
(n+2)2
n(n+4)θ0(k)
(n+2)2 (1− μ) θ0 (k)
n(n+4)θ0(k)
(n+2)2 −2n(n+4)(n+2)2 −1
(1− μ) θ0 (k) −1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
where Λij = ∂2Λ/∂i∂j (i, j = k, a,λ). The bordered Hessian matrix is negative denite
if and only if ¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
Λkk Λka Λkλ
Λak Λaa Λaλ
Λλk Λλa Λλλ
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
> 0. (A.10)
(A.10) holds if Λkk < 0 and
ΛkkΛaa − ΛkaΛak = −2n (n+ 4)(n+ 2)2
(
θ00 (k)
θ0 (k) +
θ0 (k)2
2
)
> 0,
which are assured by assumption 2.
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(ii) Uniqueness of the rst-stage equilibrium
Totally diﬀerentiating (22) and making use of Young’s theorem, we obtain the second-
order condition for the social welfare maximization problem in the rst-stage:
d2W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ2 =W
∗kk
µdk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ
¶2
+ 2W ∗kμdk
∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ +W
∗μμ (A.11)
where
W ∗kk = ∂
2W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂k2 = −
θ00 (k∗)
n+ 2 {(n+ μn+ 3) x
∗ + n (n− 2μ+ 3) y∗}
+ θ
0 (k∗)2
(n+ 2)2 (n+ μn+ 3) (n− μn+ 1) , (A.12)
W ∗kμ = ∂
2W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂k∂μ = −
nθ0 (k∗)
n+ 2
∙
x∗ − 2y∗ − 3μn+ 4μ+ 1n+ 2 {aB − θ (k
∗)}
¸
,
and
W ∗μμ = ∂
2W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
∂μ2 = −
n2 {aB − θ (k∗)}2
(n+ 2)2 .
With aB = θ (k∗), (A.11) can be rewritten as
d2W ∗ (μ, aB, k∗, n)
dμ2 =
½
W ∗kk dk
∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ + 2W
∗kμ
¾ dk∗ (μ, aB, n)
dμ .
Since from (A.12), W ∗kk < 0 if and only if
θ00 (k∗) > (n+ μn+ 3) (n− μn+ 1)(n+ 2) {(n+ μn+ 3)x∗ + n (n− 2μ+ 3) y∗}θ
0 (k∗)2 > 0
and from (A.7), dk∗ (μ, aB, n) /dμ > 0, d2W ∗/dμ2 < 0 holds if θ (k) is suﬃciently
convex such that with aB = θ (k∗), W ∗kk (dk∗/dμ) + 2W ∗kμ < 0 for any μ and n.
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